petroleum 5.pet.0003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

185. Japan Suggests That Reciprocal Permits Facilitate Maintenance of American and Japanese Embassies

The Japanese government asked that the United States guarantee, under the principle of reciprocity, that Japanese diplomatic and consulate organizations in the United States be permitted to draw funds for the maintenance of offices and the expenses of personnel.[640]

On August 27, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Minister handed Ambassador Grew in Tokyo a document containing Japan's opinions on this subject, and on the same day a similar document was transmitted to Ambassador Nomura with instructions that he contact the American State Department concerning it. Japan pointed out that by the present reciprocal arrangement effective between Japan, England, Australia, Canada and Holland, it was possible to exclude the Ambassador, Consul, and employees of government offices from the investigations following transactions of foreigners. This agreement did not include public funds, but exempted only personal accounts of consular officials from investigation.

Since the United States did not permit the practice which Japan had accorded to American officials in Tokyo, the Japanese government felt obliged to make certain revisions in the American proposals concerning Japanese funds. Japan desired that the investigation of the actual expenses connected with telegraphic matters, salaries of employees, rents and entertainment expenses be omitted.[641] Furthermore, a permit should not be required for the receipt of money transferred to another official account.

On the other hand, America should grant a permit when Embassy and Consulates and other government offices wished to pay into the Japanese national treasury any balance on hand of current operating expenses and funds arising from the disposal of assets. Moreover, the income received by the consulate and the salaries of the consulate employees should be allowed to be sent to Japan. In regard to the personal living and traveling expenses, the standard set was to be 1500 yen a month in Japan and $500.00 a month in America. Permits for established salaries were to be issued reciprocally for the payment of both the Japanese and American Ambassadors, their Financial Attaches, Military and Naval Attaches, and Embassy secretaries.[642]

If any circumstances rendered necessary a greater amount than that already agreed upon, either the American or Japanese Ambassador, as the case might be, was to apply for a separate permit upon each occasion. After a list of the Japanese employees above the rank of clerk was furnished to the State Department by the Japanese Embassy in Washington, the American government was to grant the Yokohama Specie Bank a general permit covering the payment of salaries to these employees by the Japanese Foreign Office. If the expenses remitted through the Yokohama Specie Bank exceeded the $500.00 per month limit, the United States government was to grant a permit for the additional funds immediately upon the request of the Japanese Embassy.[643]

When Ambassador Nomura presented this memorandum from his government, he expressed the opinion that although the present arrangement would be effective only in the Japanese Empire and the United States respectively, it should be extended even further. If America facilitated the clearing of dollar remittances to Japanese offices and employees in South America and Europe as well, the Japanese Ambassador promised to recommend that the Manchurian and Nanking governments accord similar privileges to American offices in that area.[644]

[640] III, 376.
[641] III, 403.
[642] Ibid.
[643] Ibid.
[644] Ibid.

[141]

186. Japan Sets Date for Evacuation of American Missionaries

On September 2, 1941 the Governor-General's Office in Korea announced that in view of the fact that all thirteen of the American missionaries had consented to evacuate, all pending litigation would be dismissed and the missionaries would sail to Shanghai on Japanese vessels. Departing from Japan on ships leaving on August 26 and September 16, 1941, they would transfer at Shanghai to American vessels for the trip to the United States.[645]

187. Japan Opposes American Aid Sent to Russia Via Vladivostok[646]

On September 4, 1941 the Japanese Military Attache made another report on American aid being sent to Russia via Vladivostok. In his opinion the American public did not support aid to Russia so wholeheartedly as that to China. Therefore, he believed that Tokyo could openly oppose the routing of American tankers to Russia.[647]

If it were emphasized that the Japanese Navy held maneuvers in that area, and if at the same time the sinking of the Terukuni Maru in those mined waters was recalled, the Japanese Military Attache believed that American supplies to Russia would be rerouted in the future. At the same time, however, he emphasized that the Japanese government should not put too much pressure upon American officials, otherwise a commercial war might commence which would result finally in the complete economic destruction of the Japanese Empire.[648]

188. Japanese Finance Minister Attempts to Avoid Petroleum Sales Restrictions

On September 4, 1941 a Japanese official in Washington reported to the Minister of Finance in Tokyo concerning the problem of obtaining funds with which to purchase petroleum from the United States. According to this official's opinion, diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States must inevitably become more favorable, for if the situation were allowed to become worse, trade between Japan and South America would greatly suffer and any attempts of the Japanese to preserve their deposits there would be thwarted. On the other hand, if the situation improved, Japanese officials could send money from the United States to South America. To secure the necessary petroleum, therefore, it would be advantageous if the Japanese government heeded America's current demands so that means of paying for any petroleum purchases could be devised by Japan.[649] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

The finance officer promised to discuss the problem with the American State and Treasury Departments and the Foreign Fund Control Board. After the United States had put into effect the freezing measures against Japan, the Japanese government had sent funds to South America for the purchase of certain goods. In view of this the finance officer suggested that in the future a portion of these funds should be used to pay for United States exports and, particularly, in the purchase of petroleum. Any other money in gold accumulated in other countries was also to be used for this purpose, though it would be necessary to secure permits beforehand from the Exchange Control Organization in each country.[650]

The Japanese official pointed out that the United States could effect a freezing of funds in related banks in order to impair Japan's South American policy, though such action had been delayed by the United States because of the Japanese-American negotiations. In order, therefore, to lessen the ill effects which the South American countries would suffer if the United States froze Japanese funds in their banks, the Japanese finance officer again urged Tokyo to make certain concessions to America's demands.[651]

[645] III, 404.
[646] Information in this section did not become available until January 1945.
[647] III, 405.
[648] Ibid.
[649] III, 406.
[650] Ibid.
[651] III, 407.

[142]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

189. Ambassador Nomura Informs Tokyo of Transfer of Funds

Referring to his previous message to Tokyo regarding funds on hand in Washington, Ambassador Nomura declared on September 4, 1941 that the $20,606.47 which he had been holding for the New York Consulate would be transferred to that office.[652]

On September 5, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador was asked to send $5000 from the special secret funds held by the Counselor to a Japanese resident in Cuba for emergency use. The actual disbursement of these funds, however, was to be made only upon orders from Foreign Minister Toyoda.[653]

190. Mr. Terasaki Plans to Confer with "America First" Committee

For the purpose of making secret contacts with members of the "America First" Committee, Ambassador Nomura asked Tokyo on September 6, 1941 to authorize Secretary Hidenari Terasaki to make an official visit to Chicago. Since Mr. Terasaki had been unable to make an official tour to Los Angeles and San Francisco, it was requested also that he be permitted at this time to stop off at San Francisco, Seattle and Los Angeles.[654]

191. Japan Keeps in Touch with Its Nationals in America

Arrangements were made on September 6, 1941 to have Mr. Ryukichi Watanabe attend memorial services in honor of his son, Mr. Junichi Watanabe and others, which was to be held from October 15 to 21 inclusive at the Yasukuni Shrine in New York. Since the name of the deceased was not to be made public until the end of September, Mr. Watanabe's invitation to the memorial services was to be extended to him confidentially.[655]

192. Arrest of Japanese in Possession of Illegal Passports

Tokyo learned on September 6, 1941 from Consul Nakauchi in Hollywood that local immigration officers had arrested Japanese who were in possession of illegal passports. Approximately 100 persons had been taken into custody in California. Since it appeared that "this sort of round-up" would be carried on in the future as well, Mr. Nakauchi declared that when boats became available approximately half of these persons would be given the opportunity to return home.[656]

193. Japanese Officials Leave for Japan (September 9, 1941)

Other Japanese returning to Tokyo at this time included Couriers Kuga, Watanabe and Tachi; Mr. Zozo Nishina, an engineer; Mr. Nakajima, former Manchurian Railroad Director; Mr. Hase, Diet Member; Mr. Kiyohara, Secretary of the Ministry of Justice; Messrs. Kuge and Ito, officials of the Home Ministry; Professors Hamada and Tanabe; Mr. Satsuma, Chief Editor of the Kokumin newspaper, and two others. This group had left San Francisco on the President Taylor on September 9, 1941 en route to Shanghai whence reservations to Japan had been requested.[657]

194. Japanese Speculations Continue Regarding Myron Taylor's Return to Vatican

After a year's absence, Mr. Myron Taylor, President Roosevelt's personal emissary to the Vatican, returned to his post on September 9, 1941. Various rumors arose concerning his mis-

[652] III, 408.
[653] III, 409.
[654] III, 410.
[635] III, 411.
[656] III, 412.
[657] III, 413.

[143]

sion. According to one representative, Mr. Taylor had been ordered to request that the Vatican mediate the settlement of the Far Eastern question between Japan and the United States. Another report indicated that, in view of the new alliance between Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia, Mr. Taylor was to discuss the anti-Bolshevik propaganda instigated by Catholics.

Other speculations included the discussion by Mr. Taylor of problems affecting Catholics and Catholic missions throughout the territories of the Far East under the control of the United States and Great Britain, as well as the theory that Mr. Taylor had brought a peace proposal for the Pope's opinion. In the opinion of Japanese officials stationed in Rome, however, Mr. Taylor had not been entrusted with any particular mission. In view of the present delicate international situation they believed Mr. Taylor's assignment to be a gesture designated by President Roosevelt for the purpose of spreading good-will among the Catholics in the United States, Central and South America and in Europe.[658]

195. Mr. Myron Taylor Sees Possibility of Russo-German Peace Move

On September 10, 1941, the conversation of Mr. Taylor with the American Ambassador to France, Admiral William Leahy, and the American Ambassador to Spain, Alexander Weddell was reported from Barcelona by Japanese Consul Suma. Mr. Taylor believed that America's participation in the war at the present time was unlikely unless a major incident developed, or it became necessary to combat German-Russian peace moves. While Stalin questioned the motivation of British and American aid to Russia, he greatly feared the collapse of the Russian regime and at times it was thought that he planned to make peace with Germany. Depending upon the terms offered, Stalin might accede.[659] As far as the United States was concerned, it was anxious to avoid waging a war in the Pacific and the Atlantic at the same time. Although the United States would make no clear commitment in view of the consequences if Japan remained in the Axis, the American authorities would ensure that conversations between the two countries were not discontinued. If Japan broke with the Axis, the United States was ready to make "sizable concessions."[660]

Although the moving of English troops to Malay pointed to the opening of a joint British-American campaign, it was believed that the United States was unlikely to go as far as rendering "military assistance" until its relationship with Japan was more clearly defined.[661]

196. Japan Changes Military Attaches in United States

Foreign Minister Toyoda, on September 10, 1941 informed Ambassador Nomura that Major Hotsue Ishikawa who was already in the United States, had been appointed Assistant Military Attache, replacing Lt. Col. Toshkizu Suzuki.[662]

197. Freezing Order Necessitates Reorganization of Japanese Intelligence Activities

Japanese espionage and intelligence organizations in the United States were affected by the freezing of Japanese assets. Consul Morishima in New York advised Tokyo on September 12, 1941 that even before the freezing legislation it had been decided to dismiss all persons of little value and to transfer to the Cultural Institute the most effective persons or groups in their employment. The most capable persons were to be diverted from the dissemination of propaganda to the collecting of intelligence and to espionage activities.

[658] III, 414.
[659] III, 415.
[660] III, 416.
[661] III, 417.
[662] III, 418.

[144]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

After this reorganization had taken place, the freezing order had been set in motion by the United States and Japanese authorities, finding it impossible to maintain their elaborate plans, had decided to make temporary reduction in expense funds and salaries.[663] In readjusting their plans, Japanese officials at the New York Consulate had decided to discontinue publication of the Living Age, the Foreign Observer, and the Far Eastern Trade and the Culture on Wheels Library. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire [664]

They also planned to suspend distribution of films through the YMCA office and other agencies as soon as the Japanese contracts had expired, and to discontinue publication of books for propaganda purposes in connection with the World Over Printing Enterprise. The publications, the Orient and the Japanese American, were to be suspended because of the scarcity of funds for employees. Many Japanese employees would be kept on the payrolls although their monthly salaries would be greatly reduced after September.

198. Freezing Order Curtails Japanese Intelligence Activities in America

Readjustments in the Japanese civilian intelligence organizations continued to be the subject of dispatches from Consul Morishima in New York to Tokyo. On September 22, 1941 he said that the following of a more aggressive policy in connection with the Cultural Institute had been impossible because of the freezing of funds. Activities of the Institute had even been curtailed. The Library on Wheels, which had maintained a route hardly worth mentioning would be transferred to the Cultural Institute, and its driver would be dismissed from employment.[666]

200. American Isolationists Oppose President Roosevelt's Speech on Greer Incident[668]

In a press conference on September 5, 1941 President Roosevelt said that the German submarine attack on the U.S.S. Destroyer Greer, on the previous day, was deliberate and that United States warships would eliminate the U-boat once it was tracked down. President Roosevelt said that the attack took place on the American side of the Atlantic while the ship was enroute to Iceland with mail and that the attack occurred in broad daylight. The fact that the destroyer escaped did not minimize the seriousness of the incident.[669]

A report on this speech sent to Tokyo by the Japanese Military Attache in Washington, believed to be Mr. Isoda, disclosed that such staunch isolationists as Colonel Lindbergh and Senators Nye, Gilette and Clark were strongly opposed to the President's attitude. German-American relations, in the future, Japanese officials felt, would depend largely upon Germany's actions, particularly in the Atlantic. Nevertheless, it could not be doubted that this latest incident had increased the chances of American participation in the European war.[670]

On September 11, 1941 President Roosevelt delivered a scathing attack on the methods of Germany and promised that the U.S. Navy would shoot aggressors on sight in the Atlantic.[671]

201. Japanese Intelligence Reports on American Airplane Production

On September 16, 1941 Consul Nakauchi in Los Angeles transmitted to Tokyo a detailed intelligence report concerning American airplane production. Not only were each of the airplane plants named specifically, but the size of orders filled by each plant, the number of

[663] III, 419.
[664] III, 420.
[666] III, 424, 425.
[668] Information in this section did not become available until February 1945. [669] New York Times, September 1941.
[670] III, 426.
[671] III, 427, Facts on File, September 11, 1941.

[145]

employees and the total amount of monthly salaries paid were enumerated as well. The type of craft on order at various plants for the British and American armies was listed. It was estimated by Consul Nakauchi that at least forty per cent of the total orders had been placed in the Los Angeles area, while ten per cent was concentrated in the vicinity of San Diego.[672]

202. Japan Denies Interfering with American Rights

On September 17, 1941 more than a month after Ambassador Nomura had submitted to Tokyo a document from the State Department listing injustices to American citizens in Japanese occupied territory, the Foreign Minister replied that the items in question had been investigated by the departments concerned. Subsequently, such reports of interference or injustices could be clarified as (1) items of misunderstanding for which there was no basis of fact, (2) conditions which, for a time, due to certain circumstances, did exist, but which were now restored to normal and, (3) conditions which, because of the present state of things, still existed, but which Japan was considering restoring to normal as soon as their continuance was no longer necessary.

In referring to the infraction of the right of the Standard Oil Company to draw funds with which to pay its telephone bill, the Foreign Minister said that officials who had administered the freezing order were unaccustomed to the procedure and some inconvenience was experienced in the drawing out of funds. The conditions, however, were gradually being eliminated. In the case of individuals, restrictions had been eased up to make it possible for foreigners to withdraw funds deposited in their own names to the amount of 1,000 yen per month for living and other expenses consistent with this. Ambassador Nomura was to bear these facts in mind when he replied to the United States government.[673]

203. Ambassador Nomura Requests Change in Japanese Broadcasts

Because the 4:30 A.M. Japanese broadcast, as well as the 4:00 to 7:00 A.M. Domei broadcasts could hardly be heard, Ambassador Nomura asked that Tokyo consider changing the wave length. Although the Domei broadcasts had been excellent, by September 18, 1941, they had faded out completely. Furthermore, static had increased on the 8:30 A.M. broadcasts to the point where they could not be understood.[674]

204. Ambassador Nomura Reports on American Lend-Lease Shipments

Meanwhile Ambassador Nomura in Washington had been able to obtain from intelligence sources facts pertaining to the American Lend-Lease Act, which were transmitted by circular to Japanese representatives in London, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Berlin and Tokyo. The Ambassador pointed out that out of the original $7,000,000,000, which had been authorized, only $6,200,000,000 had been allotted and as of September 18, 1941 the actual payment had not exceeded $390,000,000.

According to the Japanese Ambassador, some progress had been made in the actual aid given, but what had been accomplished had not measured up to expectations especially for planes, tanks, machine tools, arms and ammunition. Of the amount of defense materials exported, which included arms and ammunition, airplanes and tanks, ships and agricultural products, the greater part had been shipped to England, Central Asia, Africa and the American countries. The reasons advanced by the Japanese Ambassador as to why progress had not come up to expectations was that the production process was still in the stage of development, and there was a shortage of shipping.[675]

[672] III, 428, 429.
[673] III, 430.
[674] III, 431.
[675] III, 432.

[146]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

205. Freezing Order Creates Financial Difficulties for Japanese Diplomats

Financial difficulties were being experienced by the Japanese Legation staff in the United States as a result of the freezing order. On September 18, 1941 the Japanese Consul in San Francisco informed Ambassador Nomura in Washington of the salaries of himself, of Consul Kazuyoshi Inagaki, Vice-Consul Takahasi, Secretary Kensuke Sato, Secretary Shigero Imai, Secretary Kurata and Interpreter Hasizume. He advised Ambassador Nomura that the San Francisco branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank was handling each of the accounts listed as a separate checking account.[676]

206. Japan Stops Shipping Film to Germany Via America

On September 18, 1941 Consul Morishima in New York advised Tokyo to stop the shipment of Japanese film to Germany via San Francisco and Buenos Aires. Since certain documents which had been discovered by American customs officials in previous shipments had been played up greatly in American movie magazines, it was supposed that American officials would continue to "spite" Japan in this manner.[677]

207. German Attache Discounts Probability of Japanese-American War

The Japanese Military Attache replied to Tokyo on September 20, 1941 that the German Attache in Washington believed that Great Britain would benefit from a Japanese attack on Russia, since it would lessen the danger to British interests further south. Nevertheless, he emphasized that both Great Britain and the United States would feel obligated to continue aid to Russia.[678]

Even though the Japanese Army were to invade the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore, the German Attache said, the United States might be willing to overlook this aggression provided the Japanese military forces did not attack the Philippines nor block America's supply of tin and rubber from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. In the event that Japan did control tin and rubber by virtue of its conquests in the southwest Pacific, the German Attache did not support the theory that the United States would immediately begin a devastating commercial war against Japan. He believed that the United States would delay further economic restrictions against Japan so long that they would be ineffective, for in the meantime Japan would have gained control of all the necessary materials of war.[679]

However, in evaluating these opinions of the German Attache, the Japanese Military Attache reminded his superiors that German and Italian officials were noted for being over-optimistic with regard to the Japanese-American situation. Therefore, it would be an unwise military policy for the Japanese government to order a further advance into the south Pacific on the basis of unfounded optimism, which he suspected was deliberately planned to impel Japan into a northern or southern drive. The Japanese official pointed out that in order to ensure a complete supply of war materials from Australia and India, the United States would be forced to augment its power in the Far East. Therefore, any further southward move by the Japanese forces would force the United States to enact some counter-measures. Although the United States might not actually enter in actual warfare with Japan, it was highly probable that the two countries would engage in severe economic warfare.[680]

[676] III, 433.
[677] III, 434.
[678] III, 435.
[679] Ibid.
[680] Ibid.

[147]

208. Japan Estimates the Number of Potential Evacuees from the United States

(a) Report from Los Angeles

On September 22, 1941, in answer to a special dispatch from Tokyo to its Consul in the United States regarding the dispatching of a special vessel to evacuate Japanese nationals. Consul Nakauchi transmitted an estimate of the number of persons who would have to be evacuated from Los Angeles. In this group were four government employees, 300 persons who were unable to finance transportation for themselves, and possibly 40 merchants.[681]

(b) Report from Portland, Oregon

Japanese Consul Oka in Portland, Oregon informed the Japanese Embassy on September 22, 1941 in answer to the questionnaire regarding the evacuation of Japanese nationals, that none under his jurisdiction came under the category of those to be evacuated. Four or five, however, had no objection to being evacuated.[682]

(c) Report from New York

Consul Morishima, in accordance with instructions concerning evacuees and Japanese Nationals, informed Consul Muto in San Francisco on September 24, 1941 that three or four students, a member of the Cultural Institute Director's family, two newspapermen and six railway and Tourist Bureau officials constituted the only group in the New York vicinity who had decided to leave the country at present. When conditions become more critical, however, approximately 160 to 180 businessmen and 30 students hoped to return home. It appeared that evacuation by American steamers was out of the question.[683]

209. Foreign Minister Toyoda Explains Evacuation of Russian Embassy Members

On September 22, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura in Washington that the Domei report of the evacuation of some fifty members of the Russian Embassy in Tokyo had given the United States the false impression that relations between Moscow and Tokyo were in a critical stage and that a wholesale evacuation was imminent. As a matter of fact, Mr. Toyoda said, all the Russians that had left Tokyo were the Ambassador's wife and children together with several members of the staff. There was nothing extraordinary in these few people quitting the Embassy in Tokyo at this time.[684]

210. Tokyo Learns that NBC Reception of Far Eastern Broadcasts Is on 24-Hour Basis

The establishment of an NBC listening post in North Hollywood for the purpose of listening in on Far Eastern broadcasts was reported by Consul Nakauchi in Los Angeles on September 24, 1941. Six or seven RCA receiving units recorded broadcasts from Japan, China, the Netherlands East Indies, Malay, Thailand and possibly French Indo-China. The receiving station had been established in the private residence of an NBC technician in North Hollywood where five persons, technicians and translators, conducted a continuous listening service. Together with the personnel of the New York receiving station in Bellmore, Long Island, a staff of 22 persons were receiving Far Eastern Broadcasts 24 hours a day.[685]

Listening in on uncensored broadcasts, the Hollywood staff transmitted the information to New York by teletype when it believed the information to be of military value. The reception of

[681] III, 436, 437.
[682] III, 438.
[683] III, 439.
[684] III, 440.
[685] III, 441.

[148]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Japanese broadcasts, especially Japanese short wave broadcasts to the South Seas and to various Asiatic coast stations, as well as Manchurian, Chinese, and Palau broadcasts to Japan, were receiving concentrated attention.[686]

211. Consul Morishima Deplores Optimism of Japanese Business Firms.

A word of warning to Japanese firms which were inclined to regard Japanese-American relations with too much optimism was advised by Consul Morishima in a dispatch to Tokyo on September 26, 1941. He pointed out that the Yokohama Specie Bank was using the upward price trend of Japanese securities as indicative of a favorable turn in Japanese-American relations, while the Osaka Steamship Company had advised its branch officials to go ahead and meet their expenses and if they found themselves short, supplementary funds would be sent. The Japanese Consul believed that commercial firms and banks should be advised to await the actual turn of events before proceeding in this manner.[687]

212. Japan Inquires Concerning the Releasing of Funds for Petroleum

Although negotiating with the Chief of Bureau in Charge of Foreign Funds in Washington on September 20, 1941 Japanese officials received no encouragement in solving their problem of getting funds with which to purchase petroleum. To their suggestion that payment be made by money brought in via South America some consideration during the following week was promised, but payment in Japanese money was refused.[688]

An inquiry regarding the question of payment for petroleum was sent from the Chief of the Exchange Bureau to Finance Official Nishiyama in Washington on September 26, 1941. Since Japan found it necessary to hasten this matter it requested that the Finance Official learn the attitude of the United States.[689]

Four days later Finance Attache Nobuo Yamada telegraphed that he was able to learn nothing at all from American officials concerning the matter of money with which to purchase petroleum. It would appear, he said, that the committee was arguing this matter and could reach no decision, although upon his subsequent inquiries, their attitude had appeared more and more unfavorable. The proposal that Japan transfer funds from South America had been made at the committee's suggestion, but when Mr. Yamada had accepted it, they had merely cancelled the plan and proposed another in its place. This, he said, gave them an excuse for further delay and refusals.[690]

213. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo to Allow Americans to Leave Japan

On September 30, 1941 Ambassador Nomura advised that in spite of the fact that it would be impossible to get accommodations for all Japanese and Nisei in the United States to return to Japan, the 140 or 150 Americans in Japan should be given permission to leave. He pointed out that the United States attached a great deal of importance to allowing Americans to leave Japan.[691]

214. Ambassador Nomura Requests Permits for Japanese Deposit Banks in America

An inquiry concerning the procurement of funds was sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on September 30, 1941. He stated that the deposit banks of the Yokohama Specie Bank should be granted permits rather than the Yokohama Specie Bank itself, and inquired

[686] III, 442.
[687] III, 443.
[688] III, 444.
[689] III, 445.
[690] III, 446-447.
[691] III, 448.

[149]

whether the financial agreement covered these banks. The Yokohama Specie Bank carried accounts in branches which were located at San Francisco, Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Manila.[692]

215. Ambassador Nomura Requests that Cultural Institutions be Exempted from Freezing

Learning that $6,500 in American money, which had been sent by the Philadelphia Christian College to a girl's school in Tokyo had been frozen, Ambassador Nomura suggested to Tokyo on September 30, 1941 that cultural institutions should be allowed to send money freely. If the Japanese Foreign Office could discuss this matter with American representatives in Tokyo, it might be possible to permit remittances between cultural institutions without freezing.[693]

216. Japan Requests Mutual Agreement in Evacuating Nationals and Returning Goods

Ambassador Nomura learned on October 2, 1941 that the sending of ships to evacuate Japanese nationals would be difficult as long as there was no promise by the United States not to detain these vessels by legal claims. Although the commandeering of passenger ships was being considered, Japan wished to avoid this step since such ships would be called evacuation ships. Promising to consider the possibility of sailing permits for Americans, if space permitted, the Foreign Office directed Ambassador Nomura to visit the State Department to make further arrangements.[694]

In case left-over goods were to be shipped from Japan, the United States should arrange for their export and at the same time grant permits to release goods which were to be sent to Japan. If special ships were sent from Japan, they would have to be completely excluded from all legal claims by an arrangement between the two governments.[695] Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that he was exerting every effort to settle this matter and expected Ambassador Nomura also to do his best.[696]

217. Japanese Foreign Minister Cites Instances of American Discrimination

Giving details of instances of alleged discrimination suffered by Japanese in the United States as well as Central and South America,[697] Foreign Minister Toyoda circularized a message to Peking, Tsingtao, Nanking, Shanghai, and Tientsin on October 2, 1941 which was designed to present Japan's viewpoint concerning the treatment of Americans.

During a trip made by Japan's Minister to Mexico, Mr. Yoshioki Miura, and Interpreter Shintaro Fukushima on September 15, 1941 their baggage had been examined by Pan-American Airway officials. Although no sealed documents had been molested, the Japanese officials had been refused permission to board the plane unless they would consent to the examination. Furthermore, Minister Yamagata, returning from Chile, had been informed by Pan American Airways officials of these same rules. When Secretary Terasaki had left Washington for a visit to Port of Spain, Trinidad, the Pan American Airways officials, saying that regulations required the search, had examined his luggage.[698]

Furthermore, when the Heian Maru had left Seattle in August, Japanese passengers had been submitted to physical examination during which both men and women were stripped to their underwear. When the Asama Maru left Los Angeles, also in August, Japanese passengers

[692] III, 449.
[693] III, 450.
[694] III, 451.
[695] III, 452.
[696] III, 453.
[697] See III, Part A, Section 12.
[698] III, 454.

[150]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

had been stripped of their clothing and submitted to physical examination. However, when Japanese had embarked on the President Taylor at San Francisco and the French liner, the Marshal Joffre, no special physical examination had been given.[699]

The physical examinations, Foreign Minister Toyoda said, might have been made through a misunderstanding of the freezing order and through the fact that there had been a rumor that Japanese ships were carrying away cash in United States dollars. Since an agreement had been made recently between Japan and the United States not to examine the baggage of evacuating diplomats or to require them to submit a list of contents, it was thought unwise to subject Americans withdrawing from South China to physical examinations.[700]

218. Japan Registers Its Nationals in United States for Military Service

Because of the uncertainty of the mails, Consul Nakauchi in Hollywood doubted that all of the Japanese in his jurisdiction who would reach draft age in 1942 would be able to get their registrations in to Tokyo by the established deadline, November 30, 1941. Since these circumstances were beyond his control, he asked on October 2, 1941 that he be advised in this matter.[701]

219. Japan Considers the Supplying of Oil to Russia an "Unfriendly Gesture"

The question of America's supplying petroleum to Russia was the subject of a discussion between the American Consul and a Japanese official in Vladivostok, who asked if America did not consider the supplying of Russia with large quantities of petroleum, which Japan needed, an unfriendly course of action, disregarding the recent petroleum embargo issued by the United States against Japan. The American Consul replied that aid to Russia was the firm and fixed national policy of both England and the United States. Furthermore, only three American tankers, the Fitzsimmons, the Associated and the St. Claire, had arrived at Vladivostok, and the date of arrival of others was uncertain. If the United States should enter the war, American aid to Britain and to Russia would necessarily be diverted to Siberia.[702]

220. Tokyo Requests the Addition of Four Japanese to Government List

Ambassador Nomura was directed by Tokyo to list as government officials, Mr. Goroo Fukuyama, Assistant Professor at the University of Hokkaido, Mr. Shigeru Mishio, Assistant Professor at the Tokyo Imperial University, Mr. Kentaro Shimizu, Assistant Professor of Medicine at Tokyo University, and Mr. Shizuo Kakutani, Assistant Professor at the Osaka Imperial University. The names of Mr. Kuniaichi Yamamoto and Dr. Hayakawa were not listed since they could not be called government officials.[703]

In preparing for the return to Japan of the Chiefs of the Tourist Bureaus and their staffs in New York and Los Angeles, Foreign Minister Toyoda directed that Ambassador Nomura request permits for their living and travel expenses.[704]

221. Consul Sato Requests the Direct Evacuation of Japanese from Vancouver, Seattle and Portland

On October 6, 1941 Consul Sato in Seattle informed Tokyo that the number of Japanese in Seattle, Vancouver and Portland who desired to return to Japan had increased by approximately 400 persons since the evacuation of Japanese businessmen from that area. If an evacuation ship touched port at San Francisco, a difficult situation would be created since territory

[699] III, 455.
[700] III, 456.
[701] III, 457.
[702] III, 458.
[703] III, 459.
[704] Ibid.

[151]

transit permits would have to be secured from American authorities in order that Japanese in Canada might come to San Francisco. Furthermore, they could come into the United States only in a closely guarded train which might be publicized jingoistically by the American press. Consul Sato suggested that not only the Heian Maru but also the Kikawa Maru be dispatched to that port, since the evacuees would probably increase in number and their baggage would exceed the capacity of one ship.[705]

With the plans for sending evacuation ships to the United States still uncertain, the Foreign Office requested that Ambassador Nomura secure a guarantee from the American government regarding the first ship, the Tatsuta Maru, as well as those to follow. Until such a guarantee were obtained, it would be impossible to arrange a fixed schedule. In view of the scarcity of vessels, it seemed improbable that a new schedule could be arranged upon short notice.[706]

Nevertheless, the Japanese discussed the matter again on October 10, 1941 with State Department officials who declared that until the fundamental problem of national relations was adjusted, there was no use trying to reach a settlement of such subsidiary problems.[707]

222. Freezing Order Forces the Evacuation of Many Japanese

Ambassador Nomura was notified by Tokyo on October 6, 1941 that the Yokohama Specie Bank's frozen accounts included all funds held by its deposit banks. Therefore, when appropriate monthly transfers were made from the frozen funds to diplomatic office funds, permits should be granted also to the Yokohama Specie Bank's deposit banks. Since the local National City Bank in Tokyo had virtually exhausted its funds, the Yokohama Specie Bank was considering presenting a proposal through its branch offices in the United States covering the transfer and circulation of Japanese funds in consideration of the transfer of a like sum to the National City Bank in Tokyo. Should the American authorities not agree, Ambassador Nomura was instructed to request of the State Department that definite revisions be made in the regulations then in force.[708]

Although Ambassador Nomura had expected that permits for the office expenses and allowances of Embassies and Consulates would be granted automatically, it appeared that difficulties had arisen. In the future even should there be a basic agreement in regard to reciprocal exemptions from the freezing order, its application would not be a simple affair. Consequently, there appeared to be no other way than to make application for permit for each separate occasion as it arose. It would be necessary to revise the amounts for the so-called government organs and since it would be inexpedient for a delay to occur in the permit for foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates, there was no other way than to have all those whose business had ceased to return to Japan at once. Since it would be impossible to say that members of the Tourist Bureau and students studying in the United States under the Department of Education were government officials, it would be necessary that they be returned to Japan.[709]

223. Consul Morishima Reports on an Anti-Axis Pamphlet

A pamphlet entitled "Hitler Intends To Destroy Japan", written by Alton Pettenkofer under the pseudonym of Else Weil, was the subject of a report from Consul Morishima on October 8, 1941. The pamphlet which was expected to appear in the November issue of the magazine,

[705] III, 460.
[706] III, 461.
[707] III, 462.
[708] III, 463.
[709] III, 464.

[152]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Asia, was, according to Consul Morishima, part of the propaganda published by the Committee to Defend America for the purpose of alienating Japan from Germany.[710]

224. Japan Exhibits Interest in American Military Magazines[711]

The General Affairs Section of the Japanese Army exhibited great interest in the organization of America's military forces. On October 8, 1941 the Japanese Embassy in Washington was asked to forward the March, 1941 issue of the Army Directory and also the August issue of the Infantry Journal.[712]

225. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo to Send American Paper Money

On October 9, 1941 Ambassador Nomura notified Tokyo that the money order covering staff salaries for August as well as a notice that September's allotment had been sent by cable had been received, but that permission to cash them had not yet been granted. Having been forced to advance salaries out of secret funds on hand, the Japanese Ambassador estimated that he would need approximately $60,000 to pay salaries and expenses in October, 1941. Although he believed the negotiation involving release of expense money would be successful eventually, he was certain that the difficulties involved in transferring this amount of cash would cause delay. For this reason, Ambassador Nomura asked that the director of the accounting section send by courier, possibly on the Tatsuta Maru, enough American paper money to cover expenses.[713]

On October 16, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda directed the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to arrange that the returning Japanese bring as much United States paper money as possible instead of sending their money by means of drafts, since recently there had been an increased demand for United States paper currency.[714]

226. Ambassador Nomura Defends His Report Concerning Rumors in America

In answer to a dispatch from Ambassador Oshima, branding reports of negotiations between Germany and Russia before June, 1941 as false, which Tokyo had forwarded for the information of Japanese representatives in Washington, Ambassador Nomura declared on October 10, 1941 that he had not believed the intelligence concerning the negotiations and for this reason had sent it as a report of secondary importance.

Ambassador Nomura believed that at a time when such events as Hess's flight to England could occur, any report should be investigated from every possible angle. Likewise, he said, it would not seem logical for Germany brazenly to attack Russia without previous negotiations. In the future, should the contents of a spy report have a bearing on Japan or should the facts of a report have to be checked, Ambassador Nomura declared that he would continue to submit this type of intelligence report.[715]

While making arrangements for the remittances to pay for shipments of petroleum, the Japanese Financial Official in Washington learned that the export licenses of the Japanese firms exporting the petroleum had been cancelled. Upon investigation he found that these had actually been cancelled at the time the freezing order was issued, because the American authorities thought that the permits had been issued after the freezing order as a result of an oversight.[716]

[710] III, 465.
[711] Information in this section was not made available until June 1945.
[712] III, 466.
[713] III, 467.
[714] III, 468.
[715] III, 469.
[716] III, 470